










(Universitat Pompeu Fabra) 
 
Tarja Viitanen 










Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of 
children. Our identification strategy relies on exploiting the different timing of divorce 
legalization across European countries. Using European Community Household Panel 
data, we compare the adult outcomes of cohorts who were raised  in an  environment 
where divorce was banned with cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same 
country.  We  also  have  “control”  countries  where  all  cohorts  were  exposed  (or  not 
exposed) to divorce as children, thus leading to a difference-in-differences approach. We 
find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income as 
well as worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. 
These  effects  are  not  found  for  men.  We  find  no  effects  of  divorce  legalization  on 
children’s family formation or dissolution patterns. 
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1. Introduction 
The legal regulation of divorce has been shown to affect a number of individual and 
household outcomes, particularly for married adults.
1 It is plausible to think that divorce 
laws may also affect child outcomes. We study the effect of legalizing divorce on the 
long-term  well-being  of  children  by  exploiting  the  recent  legalization  of  divorce  in 
several European countries. 
A recent literature has studied the effect of unilateral divorce legislation in the US on 
a variety of outcomes, from divorce rates to spousal well-being, labor supply, within-
household bargaining power and marital investments. The findings to date suggest that 
the introduction of unilateral divorce led to an increase in divorce rates (at least in the 
short  term),
2  an  increase  in  female  labor  supply,
3  and  a  decline  in  marriage-specific 
investments.
4  
Less explored has been the effect of divorce legislation on child outcomes. There is 
of course a large literature spanning various fields that has long tried to disentangle the 
effects of parental divorce on child well-being.
5 But if divorce laws affect not only the 
divorce rate, but also the economic behavior of couples who stay married, their impact on 
children may be more widespread, affecting also children in intact families.  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Alesina & Giuliano 2007, Gardner & Oswald 2006, González & 
Özcan 2008, Rasul 2006, Stevenson 2007, 2008, Stevenson & Wolfers 2006. 
2 Friedberg 1998, Gruber 2004, Wolfers 2006. 
3 Stevenson 2008, Genadek et al. 2007. 
4 Stevenson 2007. 
5 See Amato 2000 and Amato & Keith 1991 for some recent reviews from the 
sociological literature, and Manski et al. 1992, Tartari 2005, Lang & Zagorski 2001, 
Corak 2001 and Saez de Galdeano & Vuri 2007 for some recent contributions in 
economics.   2 
A few recent studies (Johnson & Mazingo 2000, Gruber 2004, Cáceres-Delpiano & 
Giolito 2008) have addressed the effect of unilateral divorce in the US on child outcomes. 
Their results suggest that unilateral divorce legislation had a negative, long-lasting effect 
on  children’s  economic  well-being.  Gruber  (2004)  finds  that  exposure  to  unilateral 
divorce legislation as a child has a significant negative effect on adult outcomes, such as 
educational attainment and household income. He also finds that exposure to unilateral 
divorce during childhood leads to earlier marriages (but more divorces), and lower labor 
force attachment and earnings for women. 
However, recent research suggests that the direct effect of unilateral legislation on 
divorce rates may have been limited in the long term (Wolfers 2006). Thus, those results 
are likely to be driven almost exclusively by the “indirect” channels, which cannot be 
identified  separately.  Moreover,  divorce  rates  were  already  high  by  international 
standards in the US before the introduction of unilateral divorce, so that the estimated 
effects would be driven by marginal changes in the divorce rate or the perceived risk of 
divorce. 
At  the  same  time,  European  countries  have  in  recent  decades  undergone  much 
broader  reforms  in  their  divorce  legislation,  and  some  countries  have  even  legalized 
divorce fairly recently, resulting in significant increases in divorce rates (González & 
Viitanen 2008). We thus propose to exploit the recent legalization of divorce in several 
European countries in the view that it provides a stronger shock than the legal reforms 
previously exploited in the literature. 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland legalized divorce between 1971 and 1996. As a 
result,  some  cohorts  of  today’s  adults  received  no  exposure  to  divorce  as  children.   3 
Divorce legalization was followed by a significant and rising increase in the divorce rate 
in the four “legalizing” countries (see figure 1). Since pre-reform divorce rates were zero 
by construction, our analysis can be thought of as shedding light on the effects of the 
“average” divorce, rather than the “marginal” divorce. 
Using European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data, we compare the adult 
outcomes of cohorts who were raised in an environment where divorce was banned with 
cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have “control” 
countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to divorce as children, thus 
leading to a difference-in-differences approach. 
We  find  that  girls  raised  when  divorce  is  legal  have  lower  wages,  earnings  and 
income as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. This is not 
true for men, who in fact work more and earn no less if exposed to legal divorce as 
children.  We  find  essentially  no  significant  effects  of  legalizing  divorce  on  family 
formation  or  dissolution,  and  analyzing  health  outcomes  confirms  some  asymmetric 
effects for men and women. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
data and discusses the method of analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results, while 
section 4 discusses the robustness of our findings and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
Our main data source is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP 
is a large-scale comparative longitudinal survey covering the EU-15 during the period 
1994-2001. The ECHP was designed to develop comparable social indicators across the   4 
EU and covers a range of topics such as labor market activity, education, income, health 
and demographic characteristics at the individual level.  
Our empirical strategy is based on comparing a number of outcomes for individuals 
who grew up when divorce was illegal with those for adults who grew up after divorce 
was legalized. Thus our main explanatory variable indicates whether or not an individual 
was “exposed to legal divorce” during childhood.  
The main measure of “exposure to legal divorce” is a binary variable that takes value 
zero if an individual turned 18 before divorce legislation was passed in his or her country 
of birth and residence, and 1 otherwise. Thus, an adult is defined as “exposed to divorce 
as a child” if divorce was allowed in his or her country of birth before he or she turned 
18. The sample is further restricted to include individuals aged 25 to 55. Furthermore, the 
sample includes only individuals who reside in their country of birth.
6  
As  mentioned,  four  countries  in  Europe  legalized  divorce  only  recently.  Italy 
legalized divorce in 1971, while divorce was banned in Portugal until 1977, in Spain until 
1981, and in Ireland until 1996. Thus, for instance, the “exposure” dummy takes value 1 
for all individuals born in Greece in the sample, since divorce legislation was in place in 
Greece since 1920 (thus all Greeks in the sample are “exposed”). Ireland was the country 
where divorce was introduced most recently, thus no one in the Irish sample was exposed 
to divorce as a child. Only individuals who turned 18 after 1996 were exposed to divorce 
in Ireland, but they would only be 22 in 2001, and thus would be excluded from our 
sample.  
                                                 
6 Only 2% of the individuals in the sample reported residing in a country different from 
their country of birth. The specific country of birth cannot be identified.   5 
The  remaining  three  legalizing  countries  are  intermediate  cases,  where  some 
individuals in the sample were exposed and others were not. For instance, divorce was 
introduced  in Spain  in 1981, thus a child  born  in 1970 would  have  been  exposed to 
divorce since the age of 11, and would be 25 years old in 1995. On the other hand, a child 
born in 1964 would not have been exposed to divorce as a child at all (turning 18 the 
same year the divorce legislation was implemented), and this individual would be 31 
years old in 1995. Note that those individuals “exposed” to divorce are younger than 
those not exposed, thus it will be crucial to control for age effects.  
The sample results in the following cohorts that are exposed to legalized divorce:  
1. Ireland: None are exposed. Exposed if born after 1978 (15 or younger in 1994, 22 in 
2001), i.e. nobody in our sample. 
2. Spain: exposed if born after 1964 (in 2001, people aged 25 to 36 are exposed, older 
than 36 not exposed). 
3. Portugal: exposed if born after 1957 (in 2001, people aged 25 to 43 are exposed, older 
than 43 not exposed). 
4. Italy: exposed if born after 1952 (in 2001, people aged 25 to 48 are exposed, older than 
48 not exposed). 
5. Rest of EU-15: All are exposed (age in 2001: 25 to 55). 
To assess the impact of legal divorce as a youth on adult outcomes, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
ibct t c ibct age bc ibct AGE EXPOSED Y e d m g b a + + + + + = ∑ 1     (1) 
Where subscript i denotes the individual, b proxies year of birth, c denotes the country 
and t indicates the year when the outcome is observed. Different adult outcomes (Y) are   6 
estimated to be a function of exposure to divorce as a child (EXPOSED), as well as age, 
country and year. Age is introduced as a set of dummies to allow for as much flexibility 
as possible in the age profile. Country and year fixed effects are included.  
The  regressions  are  estimated  separately  for  men  and  women,  and  additional 
specifications are estimated including country-specific trends, either in current year (t) or 
in year of birth (b). These trends are meant to control for country-specific factors that 
move smoothly over time. We also run regressions where exposure is measured using 
three separate dummies in order to account for the length of exposure (1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 
years, and more than 8 years). The baseline specification follows closely the approach in 
Gruber (2004). The adult outcomes that we analyze can be grouped in three categories: 
income and labor market variables, family formation and dissolution variables (marital 
status and fertility) and health status.  
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis for the four legalizing countries 
plus Greece as the additional control country. We choose Greece as the main “control” 
country due to its economic and social similarities with the “treated” countries. Greece is 
a Southern European country, which entered the European Union recently and followed a 
similar path in its economic development as Spain or Portugal. It is also a country with 
low levels and coverage of social assistance, and although divorce has been legal since 
1920, divorce rates have remained among the lowest in Europe. 
The whole sample is included in the first panel and then separated into sub-samples of 
“not exposed” and “exposed” to divorce during childhood in the second and third panels, 
respectively. Sample size is about 240,000 individual observations. Descriptive statistics 
broken down by gender can be found in the appendix.   7 
About 54% of the individuals in the sample were exposed to divorce as children, and 
average exposure before age 18 is 6 years. Average age is 39, but the sample of exposed 
children is significantly younger than the sample not exposed. Thus it will be crucial to 
account for age in all specifications.  
Exposed individuals are more likely to be never married and less likely to be living in 
a couple, married, separated or divorced than those not exposed, while they are more 
likely to have children. The exposed sample has lower income and earnings but is more 
educated. They are also less likely to report bad health. Note that these associations are 
likely to be related to the different age profiles of the two sub-samples. 
 
3. Results 
All specifications reported in this section use pooled ECHP data for the period 1994-2001 
and are estimated separately for the sample of men and women. The sample includes men 
or women aged 25 to 55 and born and living in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain. 
All  models  include  as  controls  a  set  of  age  dummies
7  as  well  as  year  and  country 
dummies.  All  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  level  of  birth  year  interacted  with 
country (the level of aggregation of the main explanatory variable). We report the results 
for four sets of outcome variables. The first includes a range of labor market and income 
variables. The second comprises several measures of educational attainment. The third 
includes some indicators of family formation and dissolution, and the fourth covers a 
number of measures of health outcomes. 
 
                                                 
7 We include ten 3-year age dummies.   8 
3.1 Labor market and income outcomes  
Table  2  presents the  results  of  three  specifications  for  each  of  the  eight  income  and 
employment outcome variables, separately for men and women. Each cell reports the 
coefficient  and  standard  error  corresponding  to  exposure  to  legal  divorce  during 
childhood in the different regressions,
8 where the dependent variable  is a  measure of 
income, employment or earnings (depending on the row). The first column reports the 
estimates from the basic specification that controls for age, year and country. The country 
fixed-effects account for unobserved factors at the national level that may affect both the 
outcome variables and the timing of the divorce legislation, such as, say, the religious 
heritage in each country. The second column adds country-specific linear trends, in order 
to  control  for  unobserved  variables  that  may  be  changing  at  different  paces  across 
countries,  such  as  current  economic  conditions.  Finally,  the  third  column  interacts 
country with linear birth-year trends, to account for cohort effects. 
The results in the first panel of table 2 show that men who were exposed to legal 
divorce during childhood are significantly more likely to currently hold a job by 2 to 4 
percentage points (for an average employment rate of 85%), and those who are employed 
work significantly longer hours (.4 to .6 hours more a week, for an average of 45). As a 
result, their monthly earnings are higher, even though their hourly wage is the same. 
Exposed men are also less likely to be on benefits (by 3 to 6 percentage points). On 
average, their total income is not significantly different from that of men not exposed. 
Note that significance levels are slightly lower in the third specification, but typically the 
sign and magnitude of the effects are unchanged. In sum, we find essentially no effect on 
                                                 
8 All specifications are linear.   9 
wages, earnings or income for men, although we do find some effect on labor supply 
(exposed men work more). 
The  second  panel  of  table  2  displays  the  income  and  employment  results  for the 
sample  of  women.  Adult  women  who  grew  up  under  legal  divorce  have  similar 
employment levels as those who grew up while divorce was banned. However, they tend 
to work fewer hours (between .4 and .9 a week, for an average of 37). Consequently, their 
monthly earnings are significantly lower, by 5 to 11 percent. Moreover, their hourly wage 
is also significantly lower, by 3 to 5 percent. Exposed women are slightly more likely to 
be on benefits, but those who are receive significantly lower amounts than their non-
exposed counterparts. All of this results in exposed women having significantly lower 
income, by 27-29% according to the first two specifications, or 7% according to the third. 
We may expect that, if exposure to divorce during childhood is driving the estimated 
effects,  those  effects  would  be  stronger  for  children  exposed  during  their  whole 
childhood compared with those exposed during a shorter period. The effects may also be 
different for children exposed since early ages versus those exposed only since their teen 
years.
9 Thus we exploit the variation in length of exposure by defining three separate 
dummies for children exposed during 1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years, and 9 or more years.
10 
The results for the income and work outcomes by length of exposure are reported in 
table 3. We report only the preferred specification, which includes country-specific trends 
by year of birth (as in column 3 in table 2). These results support the findings from the 
                                                 
9 Note that we cannot separate the effect of years of exposure from the effect of age at 
exposure since they are perfectly correlated. A child exposed to divorce for 10 years will 
necessarily be exposed since age 7. 
10 As in Gruber (2004).   10 
previous  table.  The  effect  of  exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood  on  current 
employment for men  increases  in  size and significance with  length of exposure (first 
panel). Men exposed for up to 4 years are 4 percentage points more likely to be employed 
compared with non-exposed men, while the effect is 6 points for men exposed for 9 years 
or more. The effect on hours worked is also increasing in exposure. Note also that the 
effect on monthly earnings is significantly positive for men exposed during 9 years or 
more, even though it was not significant on average. 
The main results for the sample of women are also reinforced when we allow for the 
effects to vary with length of exposure (second panel of table 3). Longer exposure to 
legal divorce during childhood is significantly associated with lower monthly earnings 
and lower hourly wages. This also leads to a significant negative effect on total income. 
The magnitude of the estimated effects is large. The income level of women exposed for 
up to 4 years is 8 percent lower relative to non-exposed women, while the effect increases 
to 13 percent for women exposed  for 5 to 8 years, and reaches 25 percent for those 
exposed for more than eight years.  
Summing up, we find that the effects of legalizing divorce on the long-term labor 
market outcomes of children are quite different for men and women. Legalizing divorce 
does not appear to harm wages or  income  for men, and  it appears to  lead to higher 
employment  rates  and  hours  worked.  However,  exposure  to  legal  divorce  during 
childhood leads to lower wages, earnings and income for women. 
 
 
   11 
3.2 Educational attainment outcomes 
Table 4 shows the results for several outcome variables related to educational attainment, 
which may help understand the earnings and employment results. The first two variables 
are dummies that indicate the completion of a high school degree and a university degree, 
respectively. The third shows the effects on years of full-time education, and the last 
refers to the age when the individual first entered the labor market. 
The results in the first panel of table 4 show that men exposed to legal divorce as 
children  are  slightly  less  likely  to  have  completed  a  high  school  degree  (by  .5  to  3 
percentage points), while there is a small positive (but not significant) effect on college 
education (of .5 to 2 points) . On average, however, exposed men spent between .3 and .4 
more years in full-time education. This is in turn reflected in a later age when entering the 
labor market (by .4 to .5 years). 
The  estimated  effects  on  educational  outcomes  are  not  very  different  for  women 
(second panel of table 4). Exposure to legal divorce during childhood has no discernible 
effect on educational attainment, but exposed women do appear to stay longer in school 
(by .3 to .4 years) and start working later (about .4 years). Thus, the differential labor 
market effects shown in tables 2 and 3 do not appear to take place through differential 
effects  on  educational  attainment.  One  caveat,  however,  is  the  low  quality  of  the 
education variables available in the ECHP, which only report three levels of education 
(primary, secondary and tertiary). Perhaps a more detailed education measure would shed 
more light on the true underlying effects. 
The effect on educational attainment is allowed to vary by length of exposure in table 
5. The first panel shows the result for men, and suggest that, in fact, exposure to legal   12 
divorce may have increased the likelihood of obtaining a college degree. Men exposed by 
more than eight years are 6 percent more likely to hold a university degree than men not 
exposed, and this effect is highly significant. However, this positive effect on educational 
attainment is not reflected in higher high school graduation rates. Length of exposure is 
also positively associated with years of full-time education. Men exposed by eight or 
more years have on average almost one more year of education than men not exposed. 
We  find  no  significant  effect  on  high  school  or  college  graduation  for  women, 
although exposed women appear to stay in school longer (by .3 to .7 years, depending on 
length of exposure). 
In sum, we find no clear effects of exposure to legal divorce during childhood on 
educational attainment. If anything, exposed men appear slightly more likely to complete 
a college degree. We do find that both men and women stay between .3 and .4 years 
longer in full-time education. This could imply a higher educational attainment, but it 
could also result from more grade repetition.  
 
3.3 Family formation and dissolution outcomes 
Table 6 presents the main results for the family-related outcomes. We estimate the effect 
of  exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood on  current  marital  status,  by  using  as 
dependent variables a set of binary indicators for being currently never married, married, 
living  in  a  couple,  separated,  divorced,  or  widowed.  We  also  estimate  the  effect  on 
fertility by constructing an indicator for living with own children under the age of 16. 
Other related outcome variables are age at marriage (for the married subsample) and an   13 
indicator for single parenthood. Table 6 displays the results for a representative subset of 
these dependent variables.  
Exposure to legal divorce during childhood has no discernible effect on marital status 
for either men or women. Exposed individuals are no more likely to be living in a couple, 
married, separated or divorced than their non-exposed counterparts. This is in contrast 
with  the  results  by  Gruber  (2004),  who  found  that  both  men  and  women  who  were 
exposed  to  unilateral  divorce  as  children  tended  to  marry  earlier  as  adults,  but  also 
separated more often. Exposed men appear to be slightly more likely to have children, 
and they marry significantly later, by .7 to .8 years. 
Allowing the results to vary by length of exposure (shown in table 7) does not change 
these conclusions. No significant effects are found for any of the marital status indicators. 
These  results  do  appear  to  confirm  that  exposed  men  marry  later,  and  suggest  that 
exposed women do, too, at least those exposed for more than four years.  
 
3.4 Health outcomes 
Finally,  tables  8  and  9  show  the  results  of  specifications  that  estimate  the  effect  of 
exposure  to  divorce  during  childhood on  a  range  of  health  outcomes.  Six  dependent 
variables are considered. The first is an indicator of overall self-reported health status,
11 
while the second one is an indicator variable that takes value one if an individual spent at 
least  one  night  in  the  hospital  over  the  previous  12  months.  The  third  one  indicates 
whether an  individual  is or has  been a  smoker. “Chronic  illness”  indicates a chronic 
health problem,  illness or disability.  “Current health problem”  is a dummy that takes 
                                                 
11 “Bad health” takes value 1 if the individual reports that his or her health is in general bad or very bad, 
and zero otherwise (very good, good or fair).   14 
value 1 if a person reports being hampered in their daily activities by a health problem, 
and “Recent illness” indicates whether the individual reports having had to “cut down” 
on their usual daily activities during the previous 2 weeks due to illness. Overall, these 
variables provide a range of measures of current health status. 
The first panel of table 8 reports the main results for men. The most striking result 
shows  that  men  exposed  to  divorce  during  childhood  are  significantly  less  likely  to 
smoke  as  adults.  The  results  for  the  first  two  variables  suggest  a  positive  effect  of 
exposure on health for men. Exposed men are less likely to report bad health and less 
likely to have stayed at the hospital recently. However, the coefficients turn insignificant 
and essentially zero once we include the cohort trends in column 3, suggesting those 
results may just reflect overall improvements in health status.  
The corresponding results for women are shown in the second panel of table 8. The 
magnitudes of the estimated effects are very small, and we find no significant effects for 
any of the six outcomes once the cohort trends are included. Thus, we turn to the results 
by length of exposure, which may uncover any underlying effects too weak to emerge on 
average. 
Table 9 shows (first panel) that the likelihood of hospital stays for men decreases with 
length of exposure, as well as the likelihood of being a smoker, adding plausibility to the 
causal  interpretation  of  the  results.  More  interestingly,  significant  effects  emerge  for 
women exposed to legal divorce  for  more than  four and, especially,  more than  eight 
years. Women who were younger than 10 years old when divorce was legalized are 2 
percentage points more likely to have had a recent hospital stay (for an average of 7%), 
compared with women not exposed to legal divorce as children. They are also more 4   15 
points more likely to suffer from chronic illness, 5 points more likely to have a health 
problem that hampers their daily activity, and 2 points more likely to have had to cut 
down on their usual activities because of illness.  
These results suggest negative health effects of exposure to divorce during childhood 
for  women,  relative  to  men,  consistent  with  the  asymmetric  effects  on  earnings  and 
income, and consistent as well with Gruber’s finding that women exposed to unilateral 
divorce as children were more likely to commit suicide as adults. 
 
4. Robustness checks 
We  estimate  a  number  of  additional  specifications  as  robustness  checks.  A  potential 
concern is that the results could be driven by the choice of the control countries. Thus, we 
estimate all specifications with different sets of control countries. In some specifications 
we include France as well as Greece as controls where all individuals were “exposed” to 
legal divorce during childhood. France legalized divorce in 1884, and divorce rates in 
recent  decades  have  been  comparable  to those  in  the  “treatment”  countries.  We  also 
estimate a set of regressions where all EU-15 countries are included as controls. 
  Table 10 reports the results of estimating the effect of exposure to divorce during 
childhood on the main set of labor supply and earnings variables, including different sets 
of  countries.  All  specifications  include  age,  country  and  year  dummies,  as  well  as 
country-specific year of birth trends. The first column is the baseline specification (as 
shown in column 3 of table 2). The second column shows the results when adding France 
as an additional control country, and column three includes the rest of the EU-15 as well.   16 
The results seem quite robust to the alternative control groups. In particular, exposed men 
are still found to work significantly more, while exposed women earn significantly less. 
  One may also be worried that one of the legalizing countries might be driving the 
results, so we run an additional set of regressions where we drop each of the five baseline 
countries (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) one at a time. These results are 
shown in columns 4 to 8 of table 10. Although the magnitudes of some of the coefficients 
change depending on the subset of countries included, no particular country appears to 
drive the core of the results.  
  Table 10 thus shows that the main results are very robust to the inclusion of different 
subsets  of  countries.  We  consistently  find  that  exposure  to  divorce  during  childhood 
significantly  increased  labor  supply  for  men,  raising  weekly  hours  by  .4  to  .9,  and 
employment by 4 to 5 points (although the employment effects appear to be driven by 
Italy). We also find strong support for the result that women exposed to legal divorce as 
children have significantly lower earnings, by 4 to 7% (2% if we drop Spain), and their 
total income is lower by 6 to 12% (although the effect on income goes away when we 
drop Spain). We also find consistent evidence suggesting no effect on earnings for men. 
  There is also somewhat weaker evidence of a negative effect on hours worked for 
women (-.3 to -.9 a week), a small negative effect on hourly wages for men (of -1 to -3%) 
and especially women (-2 to -6%), a small negative effect on income for men (-3 to -8%), 
and a small positive effect on employment for women (of 2 to 3 points, except when we 
drop Italy).  
  As additional robustness checks, we also estimate all specifications with the standard 
errors clustered at the individual level rather than at the treatment variable level (country   17 
interacted with year of birth), to account for the fact that the same individual is observed 
repeatedly  across  the  different  waves  of  the  panel.  Significance  levels  change  only 
slightly. We also estimate regressions where age is controlled for with the inclusion of a 
polynomial (age, age squared and age cubed) instead of a set of dummies. The results are 
slightly stronger but the conclusions are unaltered. 
  Additional  specifications  are  also  estimated  that  include  a  control  for  current 
exposure to divorce (in addition to exposure during childhood). However, the only adults 
not currently exposed to divorce in the sample are those in Ireland in 1994 and 1995 
(since divorce was legalized in 1996). This variable is never significant and its inclusion 
does not significantly alter any of the results. 
  We did not find other national reforms that were correlated in the timing with the 
legalization of divorce in our baseline set of countries. In particular, we are not aware of 
any  large  reforms  going  on  in  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal  in  the  1970’s  that  were 
implemented much earlier in Greece and much later in Ireland.   
  Finally,  we  estimate  specifications  where  we  include  additional  controls  at  the 
country level. These supplementary explanatory variables include (current) male/female 
unemployment  rates,  female  employment  growth  rate,  public  expenditure  on  social 
protection per capita, public expenditure on education, etc. Their inclusion affects some 
of  the  coefficients  slightly,  but  the  main  conclusions  remain  unchanged.  Because  of 
potential endogeneity concerns, we chose as main specifications the ones without these 
controls.
12  
   
                                                 
12 Regression results from all specifications discussed in this section are available from the authors upon 
request.   18 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
We estimate the causal effect of legalizing divorce on long-term outcomes for children. 
Our identification strategy is based on exploiting the different timing of the legalization 
of divorce across European countries. We compare the adult outcomes of children who 
grew up before divorce was legalized with those who grew up after legalization in a 
given country, and do so across a number of countries that vary widely in the timing of 
legalization.  
We find consistent evidence suggesting that the legalization of divorce had negative 
long-term effects on children, particularly females. Women who grew up after divorce 
was legalized earn significantly lower wages and have lower incomes compared with 
women  growing  up  under  illegal  divorce.  They  also  report  significantly  more  health 
problems. These negative effects are not found for men.  
Our labor market results are in line with Gruber’s (Gruber 2004), who finds negative 
effects of unilateral divorce on employment and earnings for women but positive effects 
for men. Our health results can also be considered in line with Gruber’s finding that 
adults who were exposed to unilateral divorce as children are  more likely to commit 
suicide as adults, the effect being stronger for women. 
We find no effect of exposure to divorce during childhood on family formation or 
dissolution patterns for either men or women. Thus we cannot confirm the results by 
Gruber (2004), who finds that exposure to unilateral divorce during childhood resulted in 
earlier marriages and more separations. 
The labor market and health effects that we find may have resulted directly from the 
increase  in  divorce  rates  following  the  legalization  of  divorce.  A  large  literature   19 
documents  that  parental  divorce  may  have  detrimental  effects  on  children,  and  some 
studies have found more negative effects for girls (Ellis et al. 2003). A recent study also 
suggests that parents of girls are more likely to divorce, and mothers of girls are less 
likely to remarry than mothers of boys (Dahl and Moretti 2004). 
 However, the effects are likely to be at least in part the result of changes in other 
household  outcomes  affected  by  the  introduction  of  divorce,  even  in  intact  families. 
Recent  studies  have  found  that  divorce  legislation  can  affect  female  labor  supply 
(Stevenson  2008,  Genadek  et  al.  2007),  bargaining  power  within  the  household 
(Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix 2002), marital-specific investments (Stevenson 2007), and 
household saving (González & Özcan), among others. 
Maternal labor supply has in turn been found to affect short- and medium-term child 
outcomes  (Ruhm  2004,  Hill  et  al.  2005,  Berger  et  al.  2008),  and  some  studies  find 
stronger detrimental effects on girls. Moreover, if legal divorce weakens the bargaining 
power of the wife, this may also result in lower investment in children, since research has 
found that resources in the hands of the woman are more likely to benefit children and 
particularly  girls (Duflo 2003). Legalizing divorce  may also  lead to parents devoting 
fewer resources to their children because the incentives to invest in marriage-specific 
capital are lowered (Stevenson 2007) or because of increases in precautionary savings in 
anticipation of a potential divorce (González and Özcan 2008).  
Although  banning  divorce  is  to  our  knowledge  not  a  reform  under  consideration 
anywhere, some countries have legalized divorce very recently (such as Chile in 2004), 
and others are currently considering it (such as Malta). Knowledge of the potential long-
term impact of these reforms on children should inform the discussion and potentially   20 
help prevent some of the detrimental effects. However, more research is still needed to 
disentangle the channels through which legal divorce can affect the long-term well-being 
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Figure 1. Divorce Rates in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain,1950-2003 
 


















































































































Spain Ireland Italy Portugal
 
 
Note: Dotted vertical lines indicate the dates of legalization of divorce. Italy legalized divorce in 
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Table 2. Income and work results  
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men  1     2     3    
1. Current employment (binary)  0.02  **  0.019  *  0.044  *** 
  (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.012)   
2. Hours worked a week  0.451  **  0.515  ***  0.632  *** 
  (0.185)    (0.185)    (0.211)   
3. Log monthly earnings  0.026  **  0.027  **  -0.002   
  (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.013)   
4. Log hourly wage  0.022    0.021    -0.017   
  (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.014)   
5. Benefit recipient (binary)  -0.057  ***  -0.056  ***  -0.026   
  (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.022)   
6. Log benefit amount  -0.039    -0.044    -0.041   
  (0.054)    (0.054)    (0.062)   
7. Log individual income (net)  -0.051  **  -0.052  **  -0.038   
  (0.022)    (0.021)    (0.027)   
8. Log household income (net)  -0.001    -0.004    0.015   
  (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.019)   
Women  1     2     3    
1. Current employment (binary)  0.002    0.003    0.025   
  (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.016)   
2. Hours worked a week  -0.934  ***  -0.934  ***  -0.397   
  (0.345)    (0.350)    (0.405)   
3. Log monthly earnings  -0.111  ***  -0.108  ***  -0.047  ** 
  (0.026)    (0.025)    (0.022)   
4. Log hourly wage  -0.047  **  -0.046  **  -0.027   
  (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.022)   
5. Benefit recipient (binary)  0.019    0.018    0.01   
  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012)   
6. Log benefit amount  -0.538  ***  -0.518  ***  -0.106  * 
  (0.073)    (0.073)    (0.056)   
7. Log individual income (net)  -0.286  ***  -0.269  ***  -0.069   
  (0.053)    (0.050)    (0.045)   
8. Log household income (net)  -0.006    -0.009    -0.004   
  (0.015)    (0.015)    (0.019)   
Country fixed effects?  Y     Y     Y    
Country-specific trends?  N    Y    N   
Country-specific trends y.birth?  N     N     Y    
 
Note:  Each  row  reports  the  results  for  a  different  dependent  variable  and  3  different 
specifications.  The  coefficients  shown  are  for  “exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood” 
(binary). All specifications are linear. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence 
level, two indicate 95% and three, 99%. 
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Table 3. Income and Work Results by Exposure 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men  1 to 4 years     5 to 8 years     9 or + years    
1. Current employment 
(binary)  0.042  ***  0.052  ***  0.057  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.015)    (0.021)   
2. Hours worked a week  0.629  ***  0.748  ***  0.868  ** 
  (0.230)    (0.252)    (0.385)   
3. Log monthly earnings  -0.002    0.019    0.043  ** 
  (0.013)    (0.016)    (0.021)   
4. Log hourly wage  -0.019    0.007    0.028   
  (0.015)    (0.017)    (0.023)   
5. Benefit recipient (binary)  -0.035    -0.065  **  -0.154  *** 
  (0.023)    (0.026)    (0.039)   
6. Log benefit amount  0    -0.023    0.176  * 
  (0.065)    (0.069)    (0.098)   
7. Log individual income (net)  -0.031    -0.061  *  -0.063   
  (0.031)    (0.032)    (0.056)   
8. Log household income (net)  0.01    0.04  *  0.051  * 
  (0.020)    (0.021)    (0.028)   
Women                
1. Current employment 
(binary)  0.015    0.047  ***  0.035   
  (0.018)    (0.015)    (0.022)   
2. Hours worked a week  -0.526    -0.191    -0.464   
  (0.430)    (0.465)    (0.671)   
3. Log monthly earnings  -0.043  *  -0.082  ***  -0.099  *** 
  (0.023)    (0.026)    (0.032)   
4. Log hourly wage  -0.019    -0.058  **  -0.061  * 
  (0.024)    (0.026)    (0.033)   
5. Benefit recipient (binary)  0.009    0.023    0.038  * 
  (0.012)    (0.015)    (0.020)   
6. Log benefit amount  -0.088    -0.092    0.003   
  (0.056)    (0.078)    (0.104)   
7. Log individual income (net)  -0.082  *  -0.129  **  -0.247  *** 
  (0.049)    (0.058)    (0.089)   
8. Log household income (net)  -0.014    0.027    0.024   
   (0.020)     (0.022)     (0.032)    
 
Note: Each row reports the results for a different dependent variable. The coefficients shown are 
for three dummies that measure the length of exposure to legal divorce during childhood. All 
specifications are linear and include country and year dummies and country-specific linear trends 
in year of birth. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence level, two indicate 95% 
and three, 99%.   27 
Table 4. Education Results 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men  1     2     3    
1. High school plus (binary)  -0.025  **  -0.027  **  -0.005   
  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.015)   
2. University degree (binary)  0.008    0.005    0.019   
  (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.012)   
3. Years of full time 
education  0.365  **  0.362  **  0.454  ** 
  (0.143)    (0.144)    (0.160)   
4. Age when started working  0.416  **  0.383  **  0.472  ** 
  (0.167)    (0.168)    (0.187)   
Women  1     2      3    
1. High school plus (binary)  0    -0.003    0.008   
  (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.017)   
2. University degree (binary)  -0.004    -0.011    0.013   
  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.013)   
3. Years of full time 
education  0.403  ***  0.399  ***  0.322  ** 
  (0.128)    (0.128)    (0.160)   
4. Age when started working  0.379  *  0.352  *  0.42  ** 
  (0.209)    (0.211)    (0.191)   
Country fixed effects?  Y     Y     Y    
Country-specific trends?  N    Y    N   
Country-specific trends in 
year of birth?  N     N     Y    
 
Note:  Each  row  reports  the  results  for  a  different  dependent  variable  and  3  different 
specifications.  The  coefficients  shown  are  for  “exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood” 
(binary). All specifications are linear. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence 
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Table 5. Education Results, by Exposure 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men 
1 to 4 
years    
5 to 8 
years    
9 or + 
years    
1. High school plus (binary)  -0.01    -0.005    -0.028   
  (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.023)   
2. University degree (binary)  0.016    0.042  ***  0.061  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.019)   
3. Years of full time 
education  0.451  **  0.713  ***  1.013  *** 
  (0.200)    (0.204)    (0.266)   
3. Age when started working  0.527  ***  0.343    0.401   
  (0.201)    (0.238)    (0.365)   
Women                   
1. High school plus (binary)  0.008     0.01     0.017    
  (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.023)   
2. University degree (binary)  0.017    0.014    0.031   
  (0.014)    (0.015)    (0.020)   
3. Years of full time 
education  0.335  **  0.52  **  0.799  *** 
  (0.160)    (0.205)    (0.253)   
4. Age when started working  0.472  **  0.183    0.124   
   (0.190)     (0.248)     (0.276)    
 
Note: Each row reports the results for a different dependent variable. The coefficients shown are 
for three dummies that measure the length of exposure to legal divorce during childhood. All 
specifications are linear and include country and year dummies and country-specific linear trends 
in year of birth. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence level, two indicate 95% 
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Table 6. Family Results 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men  1     2     3    
1. Never married (binary)  -0.011    -0.009    -0.004   
  (0.011)    (0.010)    (0.012)   
2. Married (binary)  0.013    0.012    0.004   
  (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.012)   
3. Age at marriage  0.790  ***  0.762  ***  0.734  *** 
  (0.182)    (0.184)    (0.232)   
4. Separated or divorced 
(binary)  -0.002    -0.003    -0.002   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)   
5. Children under 16 (binary)  0.03  *  0.031  **  0.006   
  (0.015)    (0.015)    (0.017)   
Women  1     2          
1. Never married (binary)  0.005    0.006    -0.007   
  (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.012)   
2. Married (binary)  -0.006    -0.006    0.007   
  (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.013)   
3. Age at marriage  0.306  *  0.268    -0.016   
  (0.181)    (0.182)    (0.215)   
4. Separated or divorced 
(binary)  0.001    0.001    0   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.007)   
5. Children under 16 (binary)  -0.01    -0.008    0.021   
  (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.020)   
Country fixed effects?  Y     Y     Y    
Country-specific trends?  N    Y    N   
Country-specific trends 
y.birth?  N     N     Y    
 
Note:  Each  row  reports  the  results  for  a  different  dependent  variable  and  3  different 
specifications.  The  coefficients  shown  are  for  “exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood” 
(binary). All specifications are linear. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence 
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Table 7. Family Results, by Exposure 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men 
1 to 4 
years    
5 to 8 
years    
9 or + 
years    
1. Never married (binary)  0.002    -0.018    -0.014   
  (0.014)    (0.015)    (0.028)   
2. Married (binary)  -0.001    0.023    0.029   
  (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.026)   
3. Age at marriage  0.63  ***  1.592  ***  2.013  *** 
  (0.211)    (0.196)    (0.321)   
4. Separated or divorced 
(binary)  -0.003    -0.008    -0.02  ** 
  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008)   
5. Children under 16  0.006    -0.011    -0.033   
  (0.017)    (0.022)    (0.026)   
Women                   
1. Never married (binary)  -0.012    0.007    0.004   
  (0.013)    (0.016)    (0.025)   
2. Married (binary)  0.015    -0.006    0.01   
  (0.013)    (0.017)    (0.025)   
3. Age at marriage  0.015    0.72  ***  1.599  *** 
  (0.184)    (0.229)    (0.316)   
4. Separated or divorced 
(binary)  -0.002    -0.001    -0.01   
  (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.010)   
5. Children under 16  0.024    -0.005    -0.021   
   (0.020)     (0.027)     (0.034)    
 
Note: Each row reports the results for a different dependent variable. The coefficients shown are 
for three dummies that measure the length of exposure to legal divorce during childhood. All 
specifications are linear and include country and year dummies and country-specific linear trends 
in year of birth. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence level, two indicate 95% 
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Table 8. Health Results 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men  1     2     3    
1. Self-reported bad health 
(binary)  -0.019  ***  -0.018  ***  0.004   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)   
2. Hospital stays (binary)  -0.007  **  -0.007  **  0   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)   
3. Ever a smoker (binary)  -0.049  ***  -0.049  ***  -0.049  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.018)   
4. Chronic illness (binary)  -0.007    -0.006    0.002   
  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008)   
5. Current health problem 
(binary)  -0.007    -0.006    0   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.007)   
6. Recent illness (binary)  0    0    0.006   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)   
Women  1     2     3    
1. Self-reported bad health 
(binary)  -0.033  ***  -0.032  ***  0.007   
  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.005)   
2. Hospital stays (binary)  0.007  **  0.006  **  0.003   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)   
3. Ever a smoker (binary)  0.023    0.024    -0.013   
  (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.021)   
4. Chronic illness (binary)  -0.015  **  -0.015  **  0.008   
  (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)   
5. Current health problem 
(binary)  -0.018  ***  -0.016  ***  0.007   
  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)   
6. Recent illness (binary)  .-007  *  -0.008  **  0.006   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Country fixed effects?  Y     Y     Y    
Country-specific trends?  N    Y    N   
Country-specific trends y.birth?  N     N     Y    
 
Note:  Each  row  reports  the  results  for  a  different  dependent  variable  and  3  different 
specifications.  The  coefficients  shown  are  for  “exposure  to  legal  divorce  during  childhood” 
(binary). All specifications are linear. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence 
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Table 9. Health Results by Exposure 
(ECHP, 1994-2001, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
Men 
1 to 4 
years    
5 to 8 
years    
9 or + 
years    
1. Self-reported bad health 
(binary)  0.003    0.005    0.003   
  (0.005)    (0.006)    (0.008)   
2. Hospital stays (binary)  0    -0.004    -0.011  * 
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.006)   
3. Ever a smoker (binary)  -0.038  **  -0.097  ***  -0.116  *** 
  (0.019)    (0.016)    (0.024)   
4. Chronic illness (binary)  0.003    0.001    0.001   
  (0.009)    (0.009)    (0.012)   
5. Current health problem 
(binary)  0.001    -0.004    0.002   
  (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.010)   
6. Recent illness (binary)  0.008  **  -0.002    -0.001   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)   
Women                   
1. Self-reported bad health 
(binary)  0.01    0.016    0.038   
  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.009)   
2. Hospital stays (binary)  0.005    0.008  *  0.021  *** 
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.007)   
3. Ever a smoker (binary)  -0.027    -0.018    -0.084  ** 
  (0.022)    (0.027)    (0.037)   
4. Chronic illness (binary)  0.012    0.015  *  0.041  *** 
  (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.012)   
5. Current health problem 
(binary)  0.01    0.02  ***  0.049  *** 
  (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.011)   
6. Recent illness (binary)  0.006  *  0.013  ***  0.021  *** 
  (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.007)    
 
Note: Each row reports the results for a different dependent variable. The coefficients shown are 
for three dummies that measure the length of exposure to legal divorce during childhood. All 
specifications are linear and include country and year dummies and country-specific linear trends 
in year of birth. One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% confidence level; two indicate 95% 
and three, 99%. 
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